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Literature reports that same-race faces are better recognized than cross-race faces. This cross-race
effect has been observed, inter alia, in European Americans (MacLin et al., 2004) as well as in Asian
Americans and East Asians (Michel et al., 2006; Hayward et al., 2008). Although research showed
that cross-race effects reflect a superiority in the processing of components and configurations
of own-race faces (Hayward et al., 2008), empirical evidence showed that (arbitrary) social
categorization similarly contributes to an ingroup bias in face recognition (MacLin and Malpass,
2001). This finding suggests that mere social categorization is sufficient to bias face recognition
performance in favor of ingroup faces, reflecting a motivational preference to individuate ingroup
members (Hugenberg et al., 2010).
Following these findings, Ng et al. (2016) examined whether participants’ cultural background
moderates the effect of arbitrarily determined social group membership on the recognition
performance for ingroup/outgroup targets displaying neutral facial expressions. According to
their focal hypothesis, North Americans should preferentially define their ingroups on broader
social categories, whereas East Asians should define their ingroups with a focus on preexisting
relationships established through friendship and family (Brewer and Yuki, 2007). Therefore, Ng
and colleagues expected that European Canadians, but not East Asians, would show an ingroup
bias in face recognition when group membership is arbitrarily determined by a minimal group
manipulation: A color-coding system indicated whether one’s own personality fits the personality of
a displayed person (Study 1) or whether one’s preexisting university affiliation fits that of a displayed
person (Study 2). Same colors indicated ingroup faces, different colors indicated outgroup faces.
In both studies, European Canadians recognized previously observed ingroup faces better than
outgroup faces. East Asian Canadians did not show this bias for arbitrarily determined ingroup
faces. Hence, the authors concluded that culture moderates the effect of mere social categorization
on face recognition. Overall, these studies provide a valuable extension of previous research by
introducing a cross-cultural perspective. However, some crucial aspects should be considered in
future research in this field.
THE EMPIRICAL ASPECT
The result pattern for Asian Canadians showed some inconsistency across studies. European
Canadians recognized White faces better than East Asian faces in both studies. In contrast, Asian
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Canadians showed a better memory for Asian faces in Study
1 (personality), whereas they better recognized White faces
in Study 2 (university affiliation), suggesting a culture-specific
effect of group membership. Generally, when observing and
memorizing a sequence of many faces, one’s cognitive capacities
are quickly exceeded, so one has to prioritize the targets. In
the absence of other veridical information about a target’s
relevance we usually refer to contextual information to reduce
situational uncertainty (Kaspar, 2013; Kaspar and Krull, 2013)
and ambiguity (Kaspar, in press). Correspondingly, color as a
contextual sign for one’s university affiliation might have helped
to identify and separate targets of high (ingroup) and low
(outgroup) priority in European Canadians, reflected in a better
recognition of ingroup faces. In contrast, social categorization
in terms of university affiliation might have primed thoughts
of acculturation processes in Asian Canadians instead. Given
the central argument of motivationally driven prioritization of
visual input (Hugenberg et al., 2010), it is conceivable that the
first-generation Asian Canadians tested by Ng and colleagues
FIGURE 1 | The traditional study design used by Ng et al. (2016) and two additional experimental conditions proposed for future studies. In condition 1
group membership is exclusively indicated in the learning phase, whereas in condition 2 group membership is introduced only in the recognition phase.
have been sensitized toward acculturation processes, leading
to an increased motivation to accurately process White faces
representing the host culture’s population. In contrast, when
color indicated the personality type (Study 1), such cognitive
processes were rather unlikely and hence cross-race effects were
visible in both European and Asian Canadians. Consequently,
in order to verify the validity of the reported results, the study
should be replicated with Asians living in a respective country
without a personal involvement in acculturation processes. More
generally, it should be considered that test-taking behavior can
be influenced by participants’ relation to the culture in which the
test is administered (Cofresi and Gorman, 2004).
THE METHODOLOGICAL ASPECTS
The study by Ng and colleagues shares one methodological
limitation with several other studies investigating group effects
on face recognition performance, because it remains open
whether group membership affects cognitive processes in the
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learning or/and recognition phase. In addition to the judgmental
responses investigated by Ng et al., other research suggests that
the recognition bias for ingroup faces reflects a motivationally
driven top-down modulation of cognitive processes, leading to
an increased activity of the fusiform face area in the recognition
phase (Van Bavel et al., 2011). Thus, group membership might
affect selective attention and cognitive processing in terms of
encoding face attributes when observing target faces in the
learning phase. Alternatively, group membership might (also)
increase the motivation to thoroughly compare memory content
with current visual input in the recognition phase. To compare
these alternatives, future studies should extend the traditional
study design used by Ng et al. by two additional conditions, as
illustrated in Figure 1.
Furthermore, it is important to pay attention when selecting
face stimuli for cross-cultural comparisons. Previous studies
revealed that attractive faces can intensify approach motivation
(Zebrowitz et al., 2015) and that face recognition performance
may depend on the emotion displayed (Di Domenico et al.,
2015; Righi et al., 2015). Given cultural differences in the
judgment of facial attractiveness (Sorokowski et al., 2013)
and in the interpretation of emotional facial expressions
(Yuki et al., 2007), the attractiveness and emotional valence
of same-race and other-race faces have to be validated
by all investigated culture groups to prevent potential
confounds.
THE CONCEPTUAL ASPECT
Finally, let us assume the validity of Ng et al.’s focal hypothesis
stating that Asians preferentially define their ingroups by
preexisting relationships established through friendship and
family. If so, it might be that we will nonetheless find ingroup
favoritism regarding face recognition in Asians when a minimal
group manipulation is applied to a set of faces sampled from
the pool of the participant’s family or group of friends. Indeed,
such a “second order” effect appears to be an inherent part of the
assumption that ingroup membership is initially determined by
personal relationships in (some) Asian cultures, while this does
not make the prioritization of multiple targets superfluous in the
face of strongly limited cognitive capacities.
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